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Abstract
This article focuses on the European single market, which has been one of the central issues in terms of the impact of
Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. As the aim of the single market project is to open the internal borders of the EU to the
free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor to create cross-jurisdictional markets, the economic and political ef-
fects of Brexit will be widespread, if not yet fully understood, outside the British polity. The article looks at the current
state of the single market, then highlights the impact of British withdrawal on economic governance, focusing on different
market freedoms, given the degree of trade interdependence and integrated supply chains that have evolved in response
to changes in goods and services. One of the lessons from Brexit negotiations is the importance of distinguishing between
different single market(s) when assessing the impact of British ‘exit’ on member states. The concluding section focuses on
the political safeguards of market integration tomanage the relationship between the UK and EU, to illustrate how judicial,
market, and institutional safeguards create options and constraints in mitigating the effects of ‘exit’.
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1. Introduction
The outcome of the ‘Brexit’ referendum of 23 June 2016
generated shockwaves across Europe. Three years after
the Brexit referendum radically different and largely in-
compatible views have emerged regarding options for
the British economy as the ‘exit’ deadline has been ex-
tended. These options have ranged from what news me-
dia have dubbed a ‘soft’ Brexit, in which Britain would
retain close ties with the EU, to a ‘hard’ Brexit, where
the country would sever many economic and political
connections and relinquish access to the single market
(Grant, 2018).	While the prevailing debates have cen-
tered around the degree to which Britain should (or not)
retain access to the single market and customs union,
what is increasingly clear is that untangling the economic
relationship, given the mass of legislative commitments
to foster the free movement of goods, capital, services
and labor, will be difficult, due to the embeddedness of
European rules in shaping British markets.
This is especially significant as Britain is a key player
in the development of the single market, especially prior
to the financial crisis, with its neoliberal model of poli-
cymaking. Such an approach is under increased scrutiny
as Brexit arguably represents a backlash against this po-
litical economy model, which has thrown into sharp re-
lief the cost of market integration in the absence of so-
cial protection (Hay, 2011). Brexit reflects a response to
widening income gaps, stagnant wage growth, concen-
trated economic growth, low levels of productivity and
declining job security (Hopkin, 2017; Innes, 2018). The
unintended consequences of deepening market integra-
tion with increased labor and capital flows led many vot-
ers to perceive the single market as more of a liability
in an era of Euroscepticism (Howarth & Quaglia, 2017;
Jones, Kelemen, & Meunier, 2016).
While the ultimate effects on the single market are
difficult to estimate; not only as the Brexit crisis is far
from over, its impact will be felt long after the new
economic relationship is in place. Though Britain has
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rarely been a ‘pivotal outlier’ on single market issues,
pushing for liberalization with significant success, it has
long felt that its institutional preferences have diverged
from those of other member states, particularly France
and Germany, due to their membership in the Eurozone
(Dupont &Moore, 2019). Recent debates in comparative
political economy have, however, centered around the
perception that Brexit will enable the EU to push the sin-
gle market in a more social direction through changing
the balance of regulatory debates in Europe and weak-
ening the liberal market coalition (Howarth & Quaglia,
2017; Luyendijk, 2016). This raises two key questions:
1) What are the potential effects of Brexit on the Euro-
pean singlemarket?; and 2)What safeguards are in place
to mitigate the risk exposure of Brexit on the single mar-
ket, given the prospect of border controls disrupting inte-
grated supply chains and creating new barriers for goods
and services?
Most studies have not examined the differential im-
pacts across the single market, treating the effects of
Brexit as uniform. In fact, differences across the four free-
doms in terms of existing levels of economic integration,
as well as different modes of governance, will continue
to shape market practices post-Brexit. The single market
is not a singular entity, but a plurality of legal obligations
that structures the regulatory activities of private eco-
nomic actors as well as public actors and services in their
provision of public goods. Degrees of change and adap-
tation to Brexit are not ‘static’ or ‘uniform’; rather they
are dependent on changing preferences and behaviour
within domestic societies in response to different na-
tional growth models (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019).
Drawing on the literature on the ‘political safeguards’ of
federalism to illustrate how the EU is responding dynam-
ically to Brexit, this article highlights how the EU27 are
applying different protectivemechanisms tomitigate the
effects of Brexit. In doing so, the EU is making ‘antici-
patory adjustments’ to protect the integrity of the sin-
gle market.
The article is structured as follows: the first section
outlines the current state of the single market, to high-
light how this core economic-policy area, is increasingly
differentiated, with variation in scope and depth of in-
tegration across different market freedoms as well as dif-
ferent institutionalized forms of cooperation. The hetero-
geneity of market integration results in several ‘internal
markets’ rather than a single ‘indivisible’ package of tight
rules and commitments (cf. Barnier, 2018; Howarth &
Sadeh, 2010).Member stateswill have varying responses
to changes in their operating environment, within the
constraints of the singlemarket, barring them from some
courses of action or requiring them to take specific action
to deal with the fallout from Brexit. The second section
looks at the potential effects of disruptions to trade pat-
terns, fragmentation of supply chains, and restrictions in
services, as those member states adversely affected by
the withdrawal of one of the staunchest proponents of
a single integrated market, face challenges to their own
domestic markets. The third section focuses on ‘federal’
safeguards to explain how such intergovernmental safe-
guards protect the jurisdiction of different constituent
units across Europe, limiting the destabilizing effects of
British exit from the single market. In anticipating the
post-Brexit relationship between the UK and EU, these
safeguardmeasures include amix of judicial,market, and
institutional tools, and are evaluated here as a means
of mitigating uncertainty and risk to the European single
market. The conclusion considers the conditions under
which the singlemarketwill prove durable by using those
federal safeguards to manage markets and help fortify
the union.
2. State of the Single Market: Increasingly
Differentiated
The singlemarket is considered one of themajor achieve-
ments of European integration, promoting economic
openness and extending the benefits of market access
beyond the EU itself. The establishment of an internal
market is stipulated by Article 3(3) of the Treaty of EU
so the ‘four freedoms’ (goods, capital, services and la-
bor) are constitutionally embedded into the Treaties. Ini-
tially, the process of market-making was intended to ad-
dress economic protectionism by opening capital and la-
bor to competitive market forces to reduce transaction
costs and promote efficiency. While these efforts were
aimed at removing tariff and customs barriers, this has
been superseded by measures to address non-tariff bar-
riers due to differences in regulations that can often be
a source of trade friction; particularly if they restrict ac-
cess to domestic markets. Many were discouraged by
lack of progress; after all, the goal of a full economic
union	had not materialized, resulting in border controls,
government subsidies to national industries, diverse in-
dustrial standards and regulations, as well as different
banking, insurance and company requirements that im-
peded the circulation of goods and services.
Falling behind Japan and theUnited States in terms of
competitiveness and productivity, the EU launched a sin-
gle market initiative with a stated deadline of 1992. Built
on the surge of neoliberal reforms, advocated by Britain,
the resulting single market program to eliminate barriers
received limited attention at the time. As the EU took re-
newed efforts to address persistent unemployment, slow
growth and declining competitiveness through liberaliz-
ing trade and fostering coordination across a range of sec-
tors and industries, there was often a gap between am-
bition and realization (Egan, 2015). In this case, a series
of difficult measures were addressed to produce signifi-
cant liberalization to open up highly protected markets,
in areas such as airlines, insurance and securities, along
with new innovative approaches that foreshadowed the
‘better regulation agenda’.
Thus, market integration efforts also resulted in a
range of governance mechanisms, from the top-down
approach of harmonization in areas of high risk to more
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flexible approaches that encompass minimal harmoniza-
tion through mutual recognition of rules, in which the
EU relies heavily on a judicialized mode of governance,
drawing on national courts as well as private litigants
to pursue single market objectives (Egan & Guimarães,
2017; Keleman, 2007). This has been supplemented by
an increased use of alternative approaches to gover-
nance that encourage more voluntary or ‘soft’ forms of
co-ordination yielding a problem-oriented analysis of the
institutionalized modes of coordination.
Decoupling from the single market may depend on
whether the legislation imposes heavier, more prescrip-
tive and burdensome requirements or loose equivalence
rules that provide for more national discretion. As the
rules governing the single market are not ‘defined in the
same way nor is their relationship with other EU poli-
cies fixed or clear’, constituent units are permitted con-
siderable margin to determine speed, extent and density
of regulations (Weatherill, 2017). Despite legal prefer-
ence for uniformity of market rules, member states have
chosen regulatory opt-outs, higher national standards,
and substantive variation in domestic implementation
post-1992. Such variation draws attention to the distinc-
tive character of multilevel governance in the single mar-
ket, and highlights how member state preferences can
frame policy objectives. This has allowed Britain to shape
ideas central to the single market including the current
agenda for the digital single market, regulatory simplifi-
cation, and opening of public procurement and audiovi-
sual markets (Barnard, 2017; Egan, in press). Voting pref-
erences in both the Council and Parliament also highlight
that the British government has been far more content
with policy outcomes in internal market issues, relative
to many other policy areas (Hix, Hagemann, & Frantescu,
2016). Voting data indicates Germany more consistently
opposed legislation on single market issues, with Britain
more supportive, and France subsequently opting for
consensus if they had initially opposed specific single
market issues (Hix et al., 2016). Thus, the single mar-
ket has produced a range of measures by building active
coalitions of member states including Britain, Sweden
and the Netherlands that have consistently supported
further liberalization (Barnard, 2017; Egan, 2015).
However, the salience of the single market has
been sidelined by the Eurozone crisis, as emphasis was
placed on crisis management instruments and sovereign
debt obligations (Camisão & Guimarães, 2017). The
Commission saw the crisis as an opportunity to put
the single market at the top of the agenda, as part of
a two-tiered response that would promote economic
governance and financial market supervision, boosting
growth without debt. A major analysis of the single mar-
ket, A New Strategy of the Single Market, undertaken by
Mario Monti, acknowledges that there was a sense of
complacency about the ‘unfinished’ business of the sin-
gle market (Monti, 2010). Building on the Monti Report,
the Commission published ‘Towards a Single Market Act’
detailing 50 proposals to reform the single market by
the end of 2012, using the crisis as a catalyst for action
(Camisão & Guimarães, 2017, p. 229). Part of the prob-
lem is that the singlemarket has been promoted through
piecemeal reforms. Some of these have openedmarkets,
but others have not due to a strategy of disjointed in-
crementalism which has featured small, successive and
fragmented policy changes in a host of areas, covering a
multitude of economic outcomes and objectives (Egan,
2015; Erixson & Georgieva, 2016).
Although the single market has undoubtedly fueled
competition, in some areas, it remains an aspiration
rather than a reality (Monti, 2010, p. 7). More con-
tentious market regulations meant that member states
have limited incentive to engage in single market reform,
despite the perceived benefits outlined in the new ‘Costs
of Non-Europe’ reports commissioned by the European
Parliament (European Parliament, 2017). The remaining
barriers to cross-border integration, especially in ser-
vices, including the energy sector, rail transport, tele-
coms, consumer insurance markets, banking and profes-
sional services, are difficult to eliminate, as services re-
quire regulation that differs from goods.While goods are
tangible and subject to cross border checks, services are
intangible, so that these barriers can impede mobility
and the ability to establish commercial presence in an-
other member state. In fact, single markets are depen-
dent on further policy actions in an ever-widening range
of fields with a direct impact on economic integration, in-
cluding taxation, employment, industrial, transport, so-
cial policy, education, culture, public health, consumer
protection, energy, and environment (Barnard, 2017).
Such regulatory expansion has also brought increases in
post-legislative litigation challenges to internal market
measures with member states seeking annulment of leg-
islative agreements (Armstrong, 2018; Weatherill, 2017).
A striking outcome may be that member states are push-
ing to preserve their sovereignty, not through following
the British ‘exit’ path out of the single market, but in-
creasingly through litigating internal market measures at
the post-legislative stage.
The growing flexibility in the laws that govern the
single market—as well as the contentious nature of
deliberations—highlights how the indivisibility and irre-
versibility that provided powerful lock-in mechanisms
was gone long before Brexit. Differentiated integration
has grown through a variety of mechanisms: through the
proliferation of notification procedures to identify prob-
lems in the operation of singlemarket rules; through poli-
cies that now operate within or outside the treaty frame-
work, and through territorial differentiation that offers
wide scope and institutionalization of non-member align-
ment with single market rules (Gstöhl, 2015; Howarth &
Sadeh, 2010). Nonetheless, in Brexit debates, the notion
that the ‘four freedoms, including the freedom of move-
ment, are indivisible and inextricably linked’ due to the
‘indivisibility	of the single market’ masks the differential
pace of liberalization as well as the ‘concessions on free
movement of	persons	(not goods, services, and capital)’
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that the EU conceded during the British renegotiation
(Barnard, 2017, p. 203; cf. Barnier, 2018). While differ-
entiation as a means of preserving national sovereignty
has become a defining trait, Britain rejected Europe’s
effort to offer membership in flexible favorable terms.
Yet despite the repatriation of competences to regain
sovereignty, such regulatory autonomy will be tempered
by the extent and specificity of internal market commit-
ments set out in any future agreement. While the single
market will remain in principle, indivisible, as member
states defend the integrity of the single market, there
exist various opt-outs and tailor-made arrangements for
the European Economic Area (EEA) and European Free
Trade Association states that provide a ‘regulatory patch-
work’ of obligations for access to the internal market
(Gstöhl, 2015). The subsequent outcome of Brexit will
also establish some form of differentiation outside the
scope of formal EU membership.
3. Economic Effects of Brexit on European Single
Market(s)
The global context in which the single market now op-
erates has fundamentally changed, moving away from
economies of scale and mass production towards a
knowledge and service economy based on product differ-
entiation and global value chains (Erixson & Georgieva,
2016). The prospect of trade diversion as well as damage
to trading relationships has forcedmember states to eval-
uate prospects of alternative, competing legal, financial,
regulatory and tax arrangements in the post-Brexit envi-
ronment. Brexit-induced corporate reorganizations have
pushed remaining member states to think hard about
the differences between a single market in goods and
services versus cross-border trade between distinct ju-
risdictions. In a major survey of businesses involved in
supply chain management, 63% of EU businesses expect
to move their supply chain out of Britain, while 40%
of UK businesses expect that they will replace their EU
partners with domestic suppliers as a result of Brexit
(Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply	, 2017).
Many European businesses indicated that the impend-
ing departure of Britain has already negatively impacted
tradewhich has grown at a less dynamic pace thanwould
be expected. The pound’s fall against the euro has also
worsened the sales outlook for manufacturers in export-
ing to Britain, given the loss of purchasing power in the
UK (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag, 2018;
Egan, in press). There is increased wariness in invest-
ing in British startups as it is not clear if they will be
classified as European companies, which impacts the
tax benefits that member starts can receive if they al-
locate funds to specific regions. New investment from
the EU27 to Britain after the referendum is estimated
to have declined by around 11%, whereas British invest-
ment in the EU27 has seen a 12% increase. Perceptions
that there will be an increase in barriers to trade and mi-
gration have led many firms to the ‘offshoring’ produc-
tion and services to Europe (Breinlich, Leromain, Novy,
& Sampson, 2019; Harding & Lewis, 2018; Inagaki, Lewis,
& Mace, 2019).
In manufacturing, the complex nature of supply
chains has led companies to consider alternative trans-
portation of component parts, renegotiation of supply
chain contracts, and temporary closure of plants to avoid
disruptions created by new tariffs and taxations. Most
concerns focus on the disruptions to cash flow and just-
in-timemethods. The high ratio of gross trade in relation
to value-added suggests that much of British trade with
Europe is connected to supply chains (Irwin, 2015). Given
thatmany products cross back-and-forth into the EUmul-
tiple times during production, products will have tomeet
rules of origin requirements to determine that the prod-
uct does not include a significant proportion of non-UK
components. Though thismay prove a problem for EU ex-
porters as well, EU exporters are less reliant on UK inputs
obtaining 1.5% from the UK compared to 9.3% of the
UK’s inputs which are sourced from the EU (Levell, 2018).
The Dutch have estimated after Brexit that the number
of import declarations will increase by 752,000 and the
number of export declarations by 4.2 million; with costs
of customs formalities for imports and exports between
the Netherlands and Britain ranging from EUR 387.2 mil-
lion to EUR 627.4 million per year (Lomas, 2018). Non-
tariff barriers also present a risk to specific industries, if
they have a time sensitive product that is delayed at the
border, potentially not reaching destinations in a condi-
tion to permit sale or usage. Sensitive goods such as food,
pharmaceuticals and chemicals for example are subject
to strict rules so that Europe will not want Britain to be-
come a ‘back door’ route for third country market access
without meeting EU product rules and requirements.
Several key German and British automotive com-
panies have indicated that they would withdraw in-
vestment from Britain in the event of a hard Brexit
(Lagenbacher, 2017). Not only does Britain represents
a fifth of German auto exports, but the employment is-
sue is also significant as German corporate subsidiaries
employ 400,000 workers in Britain, while British compa-
nies employ 250,000 workers in Germany (Lagenbacher,
2017). Automotive investment in Britain has already col-
lapsed from GBP 1.66 billion in 2016 to just GBP 322 mil-
lion in first half of 2017 (Grey, 2018). While the Germany
auto industry has stressed the integrity of the single mar-
ket, Japanese auto companies such as Honda, Nissan and
Toyota would not continue their operations if there is
no profitability in Britain, as car companies avoid rule
of origin requirements by using components from all
European member states without penalties, regardless
of where the component is manufactured or shipped
(Harding & Lewis, 2018). Businesses in the run up to the
initial Brexit deadlines were stockpiling goods at record
levels in order to offset the costs of delays; while over-
seas customers continue to divest themselves of reliance
on British supply chains. Member states are bearing the
burden of increased costs of providing more personnel
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for customs authorities in the Netherlands, France and
Ireland, to track and physically examine goods entering
the single market from Britain (Maxwell, 2018).
Across banking, insurance, investment firms, invest-
ment funds and financial market infrastructures, com-
panies are considering changes in location and oper-
ations as the British domination of European finan-
cial markets—particularly where non-bank actors are
concerned—will be impacted by their exclusion from the
single market (Wright & Bax, 2016). London accounts for
more than 50% of the gross valued added of the total
financial and insurance sector in Britain, resulting in a
trade surplus with the EU of GBP 19.8 billion (Rhodes,
2018). Brexit will shrink European capital markets by
roughly 25%, so that evenwith the prospect of regulatory
equivalence, only certain financial services, including in-
vestment, clearing and hedge funds may be included,
while traditional bank activities such as retail deposits
and commercial lendingwill be excluded from singlemar-
ket access (Fuller, in press, p. 2). The prospect has pushed
select banks to shift some of their British operations to
other major cities including Frankfurt, Paris and Dublin.
More than 2.3 million are employed in the financial ser-
vice industry in Britain. Financial services companies, in-
cluding banks, insurance, and wealth management firms
have moved assets worth USD 1 trillion from Britain;
however, private equity and financial technology compa-
nies are less likely to relocate (EY, 2019). While British
banks had hoped to keep passporting rights to continue
selling their products and services after Brexit, the loss
of mutual recognition for financial services impacts non-
European firms, notably American, Japanese and Swiss
banks, that had used Britain as a foothold into the single
market (Fuller, 2015; see Table 1). Certainmember states
see this as an opportunity to put pressure on British firms
to shift operations to the EU to build up their capital
markets. Yet concerns about financial instability revolve
around London clearing houses, as approximately half of
all euro transactions into foreign exchange takes place in
Britain.Whilemember states do notwant British clearing
houses to have access to European markets without EU
oversight, they have been reluctant to cede further reg-
ulatory authority to Brussels. To avoid disruption, there
are provisions to temporarily recognize clearing houses
after Brexit if no transition is in place, but this is a stop-
gap solution to avoid rising trade costs for EU customers
until euro denominated clearing takes place in the euro
zone, once Britain becomes a non-EU state (Brunsford &
Stafford, 2018).
As the British financial system differs substantially
from most other EU member states, Brexit changes
little for the banking union agenda (Fuller, in press;
Schelkle, 2018). The absence of Britain will have limited
impact on the final set of rules for banking union. Britain
had not engaged with these discussions as the finan-
cial ramifications from the Eurozone crisis had pushed
British interests ‘further away fromothermember states’
(Thompson, 2017, p. 440). As capitalmarkets remain frag-
mented, and investment obstacles are still high, the sin-
glemarket had not achieved its stated goal. Prospects for
capital market union are likely to be different as Britain
was engaged in efforts to improve access to capital
within the EU. Capital markets are relatively underdevel-
oped, hindering European firm’s ability to fund growth to
meet their borrowing and investment needs (European
Commission, 2015; Fuller, in press). Reflecting an effort
to shift towards market-based banking, Britain would
benefit significantly from capital markets union due to
its deep, liquid, and innovative financial markets (Fuller,
in press). While Britain was supported by those member
states with similar financial systems, including Ireland,
Netherlands, and Luxembourg, as well as those that
wanted more access to capital unavailable in their own
domestic financial markets, France and Germany were
more opposed to the undermining of their bank financ-
ing model. Framed as part of the single market project,
banking union and capital markets union in Europe are
at varying stages of development. While Brexit has taken
away one of the leading voices for financial services liber-
alization, it may mean that Eurozone members will have
more power to drive economic and financial policy in
the bloc. In fact, the presence of Britain has been impor-
tant for countries outside the Eurozone, as Denmark and
Sweden have relied on the largest non-euro member of
the bloc to protect their position on banking union.
In services, such as insurance, business, and pension
services, Brexit will result in new restrictions on the abil-
ity to offer cross-border services, generating pressure for
relocation for those that require the establishment of a
commercial presence within the single market as a con-
dition of market access (Lowe, 2018).
Member states impose different rules, whether
across pensionmanagement, insurance, securities, or ac-
counting services, in part as the single market in ser-
vices is only partially liberalized (Egan, 2015). As a re-
sult, European branches of non-EU companies are not
allowed to trade across the EU under host-state rules
so locally established branches, subsidiaries or offices of
a British owned-and controlled company lose the auto-
matic benefits of rights of establishment, recognition of
qualifications and the right to temporary movement of
workers into the host country. Many cross-border ser-
vices will face new restrictions. Britain leaving the sin-
gle market will also have knock on effects for access to
foreign lending, especially for countries such as Malta,
Netherlands and Ireland (Lowe, 2018). Losing such a
large and influential member may also impact reform
as European markets, particularly in the service sec-
tor, which is not as open to competition as often de-
picted (cf. Lowe, 2018). Italy, Spain and Portugal have
made some ambitious—and politically costly—changes
to their labor markets. Germany and France have un-
dertaken ‘selective’ liberalization in many service sec-
tors and are now championing an industrial policy to
create European champions to compete with the United
States and China (Egan, 2015). Somemember states have
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Table 1. Single markets.
Market Evaluation of UK position on Effect of ‘hard’ Brexit Industry Effect of ‘hard’ Brexit
Freedoms barriers in single market on Britishmarket relocation on Single market
single market due to
(composite market
indicator)* access
Goods Low Support • Disruption to supply Automotive • Disrupt supply chains
chains (high) • New customs
• Loss of cabotage in formalities
road and airline sector • Less focus on
• Increased customs regulatory reform and
formalities simplification
• Application of Tariffs
• Testing of agricultural
products (SPS) for
market access
Capital Medium Support (except • Movement of financial Financial • Lack of strong capital
(taxation and tax harmonization assets out of UK market Services markets
customs and specific • Dependent on (medium) • Less access to liquid,
barriers) post-crisis recognition and access innovative capital
financial rules) of clearing houses and markets
trading venues • Decline in equity
• Shift of euro- markets and pension
transactions to funds
member states • Less support for
capital markets union
• Dominance of banking
-based model of finance
Services High Support Healthcare • Adequacy decision for
(recognition of (high); data flows.
professions; technology • Passporting for
Digital single (medium) financial services
market; • Euro transactions
Collaborative/ • Rights of establishment
gig economy)
Labor High (free Restrict labor • Loss of labor force Low skill • Loss of employer of
(FOM) movement and mobility for healthcare and labor last resort
right to reside) (post-Brexit) consumer services migration
• Labor shortages curbed
Note: * Composite of indicators including infringement proceedings, solvit cases, expert survey, reports from Copenhagen Economics,
European Parliament Costs of Non-Europe report.
made good use of exceptions, justifying obstacles to
free movement in services, even as the British have en-
dorsed legal challenges to remove restrictions, reflecting
their focus on competitiveness rather than market pro-
tection (Barnard & Butlin, 2018). With the politicization
of the single market and the widening regulatory and
economic development associated with Eastern enlarge-
ment, fears of increased regulatory competition and so-
cial dumping in thewealthiermember states put them at
odds with the British liberalization agenda (Crespy, 2010;
Luyendijk, 2016).
Brexit may likely change the balance of regulatory
debates in Europe. There are concerns that the ab-
sence of British ‘voice’ will revive old ‘statist’ ambi-
tions at the European level. While levels of regulation
in product and labor markets have converged towards
a British neoliberal approach, Germany and France ad-
vocate for a more active industrial policy to promote
European champions (French Ministry for the Economy
and Finance & German Federal Ministry for Economic
Affairs and Energy, 2019). Recent calls for a strategic ap-
proach to technology, screening of foreign direct invest-
ment, and the surge of bank interventions in response to
the financial crisis highlight this strategic re-orientation.
Those advocating a ‘social Europe’ would no longer face
opposition from Britain which has staunchly opposed
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such regulatory rules for working conditions given its
more flexible labor market model (cf. Copeland, 2019).
However, Sweden and the Netherlands stand to lose
a powerful pro-business ally, as Brexit tilts Europe to-
wards strengthening issues of social, environmental and
labor rights. The coalition of liberal market economies
is expected to become weaker, while southern member
states will be further marginalized, as they depend heav-
ily on access to the British labor market as an employer
of last resort.
Despite British commentary about the intrusiveness
of European regulations, as well as continual refrains
about excessive ‘red tape’, there are indications that
British state capacities would be strengthened post-
Brexit (Her Majesty’s Government UK, 2018). Rather
than a more ‘competitive’ regime, vying for capital and
markets through ‘a bonfire of EU regulations’, Britain will
need to create new institutional and regulatory frame-
works for implementing new domestic laws or alignment
with specific policy areas of the EU. British political econ-
omy will need to revitalize its administrative capacity to
deal with the delegation of regulatory responsibilities af-
ter decades of state shrinking to address practical ques-
tions about how Britain is to be governed after Brexit
(Innes, 2018).
Within Europe, Ireland, Cyprus and the Netherlands
are the most exposed economies given high vol-
umes of cross-border trade (Bollen, Meijerink, & Rojas-
Romagosa, 2016; Egan, in press). For the Netherlands,
Belgium, Austria and Ireland, the economic impact will
be themost significant as their exports to Britain amount
to around 10% of their gross domestic product (GDP). In
the Netherlands, estimates indicate that Brexit will re-
sult in a drop of 1.2% of GDP over fifteen years with in-
come loss amounting to 1 billion euros by 2030 for the
Netherlands (Bollen et al., 2016). Similar reports for Ire-
land, suggest that there could be a 30% drop in exports
with total sales in goods and services falling by 4% of
GDP as a result of Brexit (Bergin, Economides, Garcia-
Rodriguez, & Murphy, 2019). The effects will vary within
member states, as regions and municipalities weigh the
impact of Brexit on their trade, agriculture, and fisheries
sectors and negative effects on transportation and en-
ergy resources (Bollen et al., 2016; European Committee
of Regions, 2018). The European Parliament has called
for financial support for impacted regions, given the
costs of instituting new land and sea borders, while the
Committee of the Regions has lobbied for greater flexi-
bility in state aid rules, as a result of possible changes in
the destination of foreign direct investment and disrup-
tions in trade patterns (Joulaud, 2019; van Nistelrooij &
Joulaud, 2018).
4. Safeguards for the Single Market
Markets are inherently imperfect, so the impacts of
Brexit will vary, depending not only on the terms of
the withdrawal agreement and the future trading rela-
tionship, but the type of internal market(s) that exist
within the EU. While the overall macroeconomic impact
of Brexit is difficult to quantify, the provisions for institu-
tional safeguards are designed to maintain the integrity
of the single market in the post-Brexit environment. Al-
though different sectors will be subject to economic
stress, given the need to absorb the changes wrought
by Brexit, the single market has proved to be remark-
ably durable in the past (Egan, 2015). Despite resistance
by many member states to contributing additional re-
sources to make up for the shortfall from British bud-
getary contributions, the legacy of the credit induced
boom and structural imbalances in trade and capital
flows created tensions derived from different growth
models within the single market (Caporaso, 2018). In-
creased political contestation surrounds the single mar-
ket, as certain member states seek to slow down eco-
nomic liberalization in the face of domestic political re-
sistance. Yet, even without Brexit, the heterogeneity of
member state preferences has made collective action
difficult in many areas of the single market. Deadlock
and prolonged negotiation over issues from postedwork-
ers, taxation, patents, company statutes to cross-border
takeovers, have stood in the way of a truly open mar-
ket (Monti, 2010). Europe has shifted towards a more
disjointed incrementalism, through a series of discrete
reform initiatives, where a ‘complex web of regulations,
administrative rules, national discretion, and partial free-
doms’ is at odds with discursive debates that assume ad-
herence to all four freedoms based on a uniform, com-
plete ‘single’ market (cf. Erixson & Georgieva, 2016).
While EU member states tout the centrality of the
four freedoms, their willingness to support the single
market is tied to the strength of political safeguards
to protect their respective national interests (Glencross,
2008). Member states are keen to avoid an extended pe-
riod of uncertainty that damages confidence and impacts
both domestic and inward investment in the rest of the
EU (Irwin, 2015). As Europe confronts intended and unin-
tended effects posed by British ‘exit’, three types of safe-
guards drawn from comparative federalism can be identi-
fied in terms of how they might sustain credible commit-
ments towards the single market in the face of centrifu-
gal pressures (Keleman, 2007). As Table 1 highlights, this
is especially important given the selective and partial na-
ture of the single market, as EU member states will not
allow the UK to ‘cherry-pick’ from the EU acquis, single
market or other domains. Since the free movement of
goods does not follow precisely the same model as the
free movement of persons, and legislative activity varies
by sector, the potential impact of Brexit differs across ter-
ritories and markets. Trade exposure and trade reliance
can lead to potentially unexpected ‘negative’ and ‘posi-
tive’ externalities, leading to efforts at ex ante political
control as well as ex post legal control to monitor and
safeguard the single market.
Some political safeguards are designed to prevent
British companies from gaining a post-Brexit compet-
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itive advantage by undercutting regulations and mak-
ing changes in taxation, state aid, environmental stan-
dards and employment rights that would have nega-
tive consequences for the competitiveness of the sin-
gle market (Barker & Brunsden, 2018). The EU will use
its jurisdictional boundaries over markets to continue
to shape regulatory practices in neighboring states in
such areas as pharmaceuticals, finance, and data privacy
(Farrell & Newman, 2019). Much like trade policy nego-
tiations, Europe’s internal institutional capacities shape
its strategic capabilities and behavior, enhancing its rela-
tive bargaining position through ‘market power’ (Damro,
2012). Such action may coerce Britain into complying
with European rules given that global firms may leave
specific jurisdictions due to the diverging market struc-
ture and adverse restrictions placed on their operations.
Jurisdictional expansion increases the attractiveness of
the European ‘home’ market as the ‘spill-over’ via the
EEA, of neighboring Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland
creates an institutionally differentiated mode of horizon-
tal integration, that is inspired by, but less ambitious than
the internal market (Gstöhl, 2015). This is not dissimi-
lar to the Irish backstop, where structural safeguards are
in place in the EU–UK withdrawal agreement to ensure
that there is no ‘hard border’ after Brexit as Britain is
outside a customs union and internal market. The agree-
ment means that Northern Ireland will remain aligned
with elements of the single market to ensure continued
cooperation between North and South, avoiding cross-
border trade problems, while allowing the UK during
an unspecified interim period to remain within the cus-
toms territory, if no alterative arrangements are imple-
mented. This differentiated mode of integration serves
to provide structural safeguards for the Irish economy
through regulatory alignment, if a future trade deal is in-
sufficient to avoid border checks and controls between
the UK and EU, and reinforces European influence due to
the prospect that Northern Ireland would remain inside
the single market and the customs union (Hayward &
Phinnemore, 2018). This safeguard is designed to reduce
cross-border barriers by remainingwithin parts of acquis,
so that customs codes, regulations and value added tax
are aligned, with the customs union also addressing the
rules of origin issue.
The EU may also deploy existing judicial instru-
ments more aggressively to ensure market stability, as
it has a wide range of formal powers to deal with
non-compliance with European law and obligations. The
European Court of Justice (CJEU) has continued to
tighten control overmember state compliance, while the
Commission has strengthened its enforcement capaci-
ties and impose financial penalties on member states
that disregard judicial rulings (Keleman, 2007). Judicial
safeguards are enhanced by decentralized enforcement
in which private parties may bring action if they are
harmed bymember state ‘shirking’ their community obli-
gations. This protects the integrity of the single mar-
ket by providing judicial safeguards that continuously ad-
dress breaches of market freedoms (Egan & Guimarães,
2017). It will not countenance institutional opt-outs that
Britain has procured in the past, whether emergency
breaks for migrants, financial transactions tax or exclu-
sion from the euro as this undermines the integrity of
the singlemarket. In fact, the withdrawal agreement pro-
vides for legal safeguards that allow for the continuation
of the jurisdiction of the CJEU beyond the transition pe-
riod, as issues related to European lawwould be referred
to the CJEU which would have the same legal effect in
the UK as it would in the member states. Though this is
a deeply divisive issue in British politics, ‘not much es-
capes the reach of the law of the EU’s internal market’
(Weatherill, 2017, p. 142). This discursive struggle over
deference to legal authority is a necessary foundation
for the EU’s political authority and legitimacy, to ensure
a uniform legal interpretation across the entire internal
market (Glencross, 2008).
This is accompanied by calls for market safeguards
in which Europe can extend the compromises inher-
ent in ‘embedded liberalism’, to compensate those in-
terests that suffer losses from the disruptive effects of
Brexit through trade adjustment assistance programs
offsetting disruptions in trade patterns (Ruggie, 1982).
Demands for Brexit assistance have emerged from mu-
nicipalities and regions, given the costs of increased
border controls and security. In response, Europe has
adopted ‘no deal’ contingency measures to safeguard
key single market areas including customs facilitation, fi-
nancial services, and air transport, through provisions for
temporary conferral and access rights to protect their
own citizens andmarkets (Government of Ireland, 2018).
So far, the EU has adopted multiple preparedness no-
tices as well as legislative proposals that are temporary
in nature, if there is a no deal. Some compensatory trade
adjustment assistance is also available for those sectors,
such as fishing, that will see the closure of access rights
to British waters. In the face of no deal, effective action
is uncertain, given that Brexit has proceeded without a
reckoning of the spillover effects on market access and
border controls. Nomatterwhat the final shape of future
relations between the EU and the UK will be, the British
have bolstered ‘single market safeguards’ as member
states have collectively agreed that the four freedoms
are ‘indivisible.’ Ironically, Brexit is highlighting the statu-
tory obligations of the singlemarket, while alsomaking it
more difficult to pursue close regulatory alignment with
single market and customs rules. The structural fault-
lines in Britain’s soon to be expired membership rest
on a political economy model that increasingly diverges
from much of the rest of the EU. The prospect of one of
the biggest single market advocates being absent means
that the neoliberal, market-driven growth model pur-
sued during decades of growth will likely shift to a more
protective one, anchored by French and German con-
cerns about addressing competitiveness through more
direct intervention and market concentration that ‘pro-
tects Europe’.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 19–29 26
5. Conclusion
At this time of writing, the terms of withdrawal from the
single market—if Britain wants a deal—are set from the
perspective of the EU. The amount of time spent in nego-
tiations since the referendumhighlight howBrexit was al-
ways going to be an asymmetrical process that might be
termed ‘accession in reverse’. While Britain’s departure
has generated widespread analysis about the domestic
effects of leaving the single market given the degree of
trade interdependence and integrated supply chains in
goods and services, less attention has been given to the
implications of Brexit for the EU. Yet howmember states
will be impacted by the departure of the EU’s second-
largest economy, the key global financial center, and the
largest service economy will vary, depending on specific
policy areas, export interdependence, and domestic re-
sponses to risk and uncertainty. The variation in regional
and national exposure to Brexit across member states,
as well as the differentiated forms and instruments of
EU governance, including within the single market itself,
means that specific challenges and destabilizing effects
may be different across market freedoms. While experi-
ence with the single market may be direct and tangible
for business and consumers, it may also affect devolved
administrations that have responsibility for implement-
ing European laws in specific fields, as well as administra-
tive and regulatory agencies. All these actors will have to
amend their networks, roles, and responsibilities due to
Britain’s changing relationship with the EU. The type of
arrangement between the EU and UK will depend on ad-
dressingmajor cross-cutting issues for trade that, if given
priority, may alleviate some of the negative effects.
Drawing on the literature on self-reinforcing feder-
alism, the EU has pushed ‘federal safeguards’ to miti-
gatemarket effects, demarcating their regulatory author-
ity, by not allowing Britain to ‘cherry pick’ elements of
the single market and reiterating the indivisibility of the
four market freedoms. As Table 1 illustrates, they have
also used juridical safeguards to ensure compliance with
any negotiated withdrawal agreement, as well as fiscal
safeguards for those adversely affected by British exit.
Due to concerns over ‘regulatory dumping’ the EU has
adopted contingency plans—as have member states—
aimed at safeguarding existing regulatory, institutional
and political obligations in relation to the single market.
The safeguards have the express purpose of securing the
desired benefits of keeping the single market function-
ing as the difficulty posed by ‘secession’ from a tightly
integrated ‘federal’ type system is that it creates incen-
tives for shirking and transgressions by the British state.
The institutional design of federalism shows how differ-
ent safeguards protect both the ability of the single mar-
ket to continue to achieve the goals for which it was de-
signed and its long-term sustainability.
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